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Abstract. In this paper, we propose pretty simple password-authenticated
key-exchange protocol which is based on the difficulty of solving DDH
problem. It has the following advantages: (1) Both y1 and y2 in our pro-
tocol are independent and thus they can be pre-computed and can be
sent independently. This speeds up the protocol. (2) Clients and servers
can use almost the same algorithm. This reduces the implementation
costs without accepting replay attacks and abuse of entities as oracles.
key words: password, key exchange, authentication
1 Introduction
We consider the following situation. Two entities, at least one of them is a human,
beforehand share a human memorable password, which is secure against on-line
(and serial) exhaustive searches, but vulnerable against off-line (and parallel)
exhaustive searches. Human entities have only passwords in mind and have no
unmemorable secrets, such as private-keys, public-keys (or fingerprints of them),
secret information to use ID-based cryptosystems. Two entities run a protocol
and share a new secret (we call it keying material) that is secure against off-line
exhaustive searches. The shared keying material is then used to generate keys
for identifying the other entity and then establishing a secure channel (where
secrecy and/or data integrity are provided).
While such secure channels can be established using public-keys like SSH
and SSL, users must verify the validity of the public-keys used in them (using
signature-verification keys or fingerprints of the public-keys). For ordinal users,
it is very troublesome to carry them anywhere and anytime, and then perform
verification. Due to this troublesomeness, users may skip the verification of the
public-keys and weaken the security of it.
Password-authenticated key-exchanges are very convenient for users (espe-
cially when they log in their own servers remotely with their hands empty) since
they do not need to carry any verification-keys or fingerprints with them and
do not need to verify the public-keys for PKI 1. While such protocols have been
proposed in [4,9,6,5,8,7,3,2], most of them are a little bit complicated.
1 One of the advantages of PKI is that unknown users can communicate securely.
In this paper, we propose pretty-simple protocol which is based on the diffi-
culty of solving DDH problem. It has the following advantages: (1) Both y1 and
y2 are independent and thus they can be pre-computed and sent independently.
This speeds up the protocol without leaking the information on the passwords.
(2) Clients and servers can use almost the same algorithm. This reduces the
implementation costs without accepting replay attacks and abuse of entities as
oracles.
2 Our Protocol
Our protocol is defined over a finite cyclic group G =< g > where |G| = q and
q is a large prime (or a positive integer divisible by a large prime). While G can
be a group over an elliptic curve, in this paper we assume G is a prime order
subgroup over a finite field Fp.
Both g and h are two generators of G, chosen so that its DLP (Discrete
Logarithm Problem), i.e. calculating
a = logg h, (1)
should be hard2 for each entity. Both g and h may be chosen as system param-
eters or chosen with the negotiation between entities. For example, g may be
a random generator of G and h := Hash(g)(p−1)/q mod p, or a client chooses
g := gs1b for a random s1 ∈ (Z/qZ)
∗ where gb is a random generator of G, and
then sends its commitment Hash(g) to a server, the server replies h := gs2b for
a random s2 ∈ (Z/qZ)
∗, and finally the client reveals g to the server.
The protocol consists of the following two phases: a secrecy-amplification
phase and a verification phase.
In the secrecy-amplification phase, the secrecy of a pre-shared weak secret,
i.e. a human memorable password that may be vulnerable against off-line attack,
is amplified to a strong secret, i.e. a keying material that is secure even against
off-line attack. In the verification phase, an ordinal challenge-response protocol
is used to verify whether the other entity has the same secret or not. The point
to notice is that challenges should be chosen to be unique at every session and
at every entity, and to be uncontrollable by an entity in one side to avoid replay
attacks and abuse of one entity in the other side as an oracle.
Both phases are describe as follows.
2.1 Secrecy-Amplification Phase
The secrecy-amplification phase is illustrated in Fig. 1. A client chooses a random
number r1 ∈ (Z/qZ)
∗ and then calculates y1 := g
r1 · hpassc using its password
passc. It sends y1 to a server. The server also calculates y2 := g
r2 · hpasss using
its password passs and a random number r2 ∈ (Z/qZ)
∗, and then sends it to the
2 Since we assume the DDH (Decision Diffie-Hellman) problem is hard, it is reasonable
to assume that DLP is also hard.
Client (Alice) Server (Bob)
r1 ∈ (Z/qZ)
∗ y1 := g
r1 · hpassc r2 ∈ (Z/qZ)
∗
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
y2 := g
r2 · hpasss
kmc = (y2 · h
−passc)r1 ←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− kms = (y1 · h
−passs)r2
Fig. 1. Secrecy-amplification phase of our protocol
client Now, the client’s keying material is kmc = (y2 ·h
−passc)r1 and the server’s
one is kms = (y1 · h
−passs)r2 .
Only when they run the protocol using the same password, they can share
the same keying material. Otherwise distinguishing the other’s one is as hard as
solving DDH problem that is defined as follows:
Definition 1 (DDH problem) Given gb ∈ G and d = (d1, d2, d3) = (g
x1
b , g
x2
b , g
x3
b )
where x3 is either x1x2 or not with probability 1/2, then decide whether g
x3
b =
gx1x2b or not.
One of the advantages of this protocol is that both y1 and y2 are independent
and thus they can be pre-computed and sent independently. This means the
servers can transmit y2 first (or before it receives y1). This speeds up the protocol
without leaking the information of the passwords since they are masked with
random numbers r2 (or r1).
Another advantage is that both the clients and the servers can use almost
the same algorithm. This reduces the implementation costs without accepting
replay attacks and abuse of entities as oracles since (y1, y2) cannot be controlled
by one entity and it is unique at every sessions and entities.
2.2 Verification Phase
Whether the other entity shares the same keying material with me is verified
in this phase as follows: Both the client and the server exchange v1 :=
KHkms(Tags||y1||y2) and v2 := KHkmc(Tagc||y1||y2) each other where v1 is
generated by the server and v2 is generated by the client respectively, KHk() is a
keyed hash function whose key is k. Both Tags and Tagc are pre-determined dis-
tinct values, e.g. Tags = 0 and Tagc = 1. The client verifies v1
?
= KHkmc(Tags||y1||y2)
and the server verifies v2
?
= KHkms(Tagc||y1||y2).
Similarly to the secrecy-amplification phase, both v1 and v2 can be trans-
mitted independently each other. (This verification phase may be skipped if
data-integrity is provided after the secrecy-amplification phase using the shared
keying material.)
While adversaries can perform exhaustive searches for the keying material
using v1 or v2, that is not a matter if strong secret can be shared at the secrecy-
amplification phase and no efficient algorithm is known to find the key k of
KHk() than exhaustive searches. The latter property can be satisfied using prac-
tical functions, such as HMAC [1] so far, and then KHk() does not need to be
a random oracle.
3 Conclusion
We proposed pretty simple password-authenticated key-exchange protocol which
is base on the difficulty of solving the DDH problem.
Our protocol has the following advantages: (1) both y1 and y2 are indepen-
dent and thus they can be pre-computed and sent independently. This speeds
up the protocol, but does not leak the information on the passwords since they
are masked with random numbers r1 (or r2). (2) Clients and servers can use
almost the same algorithm. This reduces the implementation costs, but does not
weaken the security against replay attacks and abuse of entities as oracles since
(y1, y2) cannot be controlled by one entity and it is unique at every sessions and
entities.
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